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Abstract    
The widespread blackouts of 2003 have exposed the critical role of ICT systems in 
maintaining reliable operation of power systems. Fundamental errors in providing 
back-up and alarm function in the control room were one of the main contributing 
factors to the 2003 USA/Canada blackout. The lack of proper ICT infrastructure to 
enable proper communication and cooperation between System Operators in Italy 
and Switzerland led to delayed remedial actions and the consequent blackout of It-
aly in 2003. Improved ICT systems would enable a better real-time cooperation 
and coordination between utilities in an interconnected power system but the main 
challenge is political: overcoming resistance of individual utilities to give up par-
tially their interdependence and operate within the paradigm of a distributed, but 
coordinated, control. Emergence of GPS-synchronised Wide Area Measurement 
Systems (WAMS) holds a great promise for improved monitoring and control of 
modern power systems and therefore avoiding future blackouts. 
1 Introduction 
Modern power systems are highly complicated, dynamic, non-linear, time-
critical, and covering large geographic areas. In addition, reliable operation of the 
power grid is complex and demanding for two main reasons: 
 As electricity flows at almost the speed of light and it cannot be stored 
economically at large quantities, its production must follow consumption 
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on minute-by-minute basis. Any discrepancy between production and 
consumption will be absorbed by kinetic energy of all rotating generators 
resulting in  their increased or reduced speed. 
 The flow of electricity in a meshed network is governed by the laws of 
physics and cannot be directly controlled1. In order to avoid overloading 
of transmission lines, System Operators (SOs) must have ability to adjust 
output of generators (or consumption of loads) in certain locations. 
All those reasons mean that monitoring and control of modern power systems 
requires advanced ICT systems.  Any problems with ICT systems may have grave 
consequences for security of supply. This paper will discuss two aspects of critical 
interrelations between ICT and electricity systems. Firstly we will illustrate this 
criticality by discussing how inappropriate ICT systems contributed to widespread 
blackouts in USA/Canada and Italy in 2003. Then we will discuss the potential of 
GPS-synchronised Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) in preventing 
power system blackouts. 
2 ICT systems and blackouts 
The critical dependence of electricity supply systems on ICT systems has been 
most vividly demonstrated during a number of blackouts that occurred in recent 
years. There were 6 blackouts within 6 weeks in the late summer of 2003 affecting 
about 112 million people in US, UK, Denmark, Sweden and Italy.  They were all 
transmission-based, i.e. there were no problems at the time with the level of gen-
eration. The systems were not stressed before the blackouts occurred – in Italy the 
blackout even happened at night. Obviously the direct reasons for the blackouts 
were purely electrical (short-circuits) but one of the reasons the blackouts spread 
so widely was the inadequate provision of ICT systems. This point will be de-
scribed in more detail using the example of the USA/Canada and Italia blackouts. 
The attention will be concentrated not on the blackouts themselves but rather on 
how inadequate provision of ICT system has exasperated the situation. Please re-
fer to Appendix A for explanation how security of an interconnected power sys-
tem is maintained and to [2] for more details on blackouts of 2003.  
2.1 US blackout on 14 August 2003 
The blackout was triggered by some initial innocuous-looking outages in 
northern Ohio, which spread to the North East of USA and parts of Canada. 62 
GW were lost, about 50 million people were affected, full restoration took several 
                                                          
1 Power flows can be controlled to some extent by so-called  Flexible AC Transmission System 
(FACTS) devices but they are still too expensive for general use. 
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days. The blackout description below contains extended excerpts from the final 
report [1] 
2.1.1 The course of events 
Figure 1 shows the geographical area and the control areas in the area where 
the blackout started. It is important to note that the events involved directly 6 con-
trol areas, which shows the importance of proper communication and coordination 
between System Operators. The disturbances started in northern Ohio controlled 
by FirstEnergy (FE) – see Figure 1.  
At 14:02 EDT, Dayton Power & Light’s (DPL) Stuart-Atlanta 345-kV line (see 
Figure 1) tripped off-line due to a tree flashover2. This line had no direct electrical 
effect on FE’s system—but it did affect Midwest Independent System Operator 
(MISO) performance as reliability coordinator, even though PJM is the reliability 
coordinator for the DPL line3. One of MISO’s primary system condition evalua-
tion tools, its state estimator, was unable to assess system conditions for most of 
the period between 12:37 EDT and 15:34 EDT, due to a combination of human er-
ror and the effect of the loss of DPL’s Stuart-Atlanta line on other MISO lines as 
reflected in the state estimator’s calculations. Without an effective state estimator, 
MISO was unable to perform contingency analyses of generation and line losses 
within its reliability zone. Therefore, through 15:34 EDT MISO could not deter-
mine that with an earlier trip of Eastlake 5 power station in Cleveland, other 
transmission lines would overload if FE lost a major transmission line, and could 
not issue appropriate warnings and operational instructions.  
 
                                                          
2 Flow of current causes transmission lines to heat and sag. If trees growing underneath are not cut 
in time, a flashover may occur. 
3 See Appendix A for explanations about reliability of interconnected power systems, state estima-
tion, SCADA systems, etc. 
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Figure 1  The area of blackout origination [1] 
Starting around 14:14 EDT, FE’s control room operators lost the alarm func-
tion that provided audible and visual indications when a significant piece of 
equipment changed from an acceptable to problematic condition. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Energy Management System (EMS) system lost a number of its remote 
control consoles. Next it lost the primary server computer that was hosting the 
alarm function, and then the backup server such that all functions that were being 
supported on these servers were stopped at 14:54 EDT. However, for over an hour 
no one in FE’s control room grasped that their computer systems were not operat-
ing properly, even though FE’s Information Technology support staff knew of the 
problems and were working to solve them, and the absence of alarms and other 
symptoms offered many clues to the operators of the EMS system’s impaired 
state. Thus, without a functioning  EMS or the knowledge that it had failed, FE’s 
system operators remained unaware that their electrical system condition was be-
ginning to degrade. Unknowingly, they used the outdated system condition infor-
mation they did have to discount information from others about growing system 
problems. 
From 15:05:41 EDT to 15:41:35 EDT, three 345-kV lines tripped in Cleveland 
area at 43.5%, 87.5% and 93.2%, respectively, of their normal and emergency line 
rating. As each of the transmission lines failed, power flows shifted to other 
transmission paths increasing their loading and resulting in further trips. Addition-
ally, voltages on the rest of FE’s system degraded further. 
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Figure 2  Overview of power flows during the blackout [1]. 
As each of FE’s 345-kV lines in the Cleveland area tripped out, it increased 
loading and decreased voltage on the underlying 138-kV system serving Cleve-
land and Akron, pushing those lines into overload. Starting at 15:39 EDT, the first 
of an eventual sixteen 138-kV lines began to fail. As these lines failed, the result-
ing voltage drops caused a number of large industrial customers with voltage-
sensitive equipment to go off-line automatically to protect their operations. As the 
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138-kV lines tripped out, they blacked out customers in Akron and the areas west 
and south of the city, ultimately dropping about 600 MW of load. 
The collapse of FE’s transmission system induced unplanned power surges 
across the region. Shortly before the collapse, large electricity flows were moving 
across FE’s system from generators in the south (Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri) 
to load centers in northern Ohio, eastern Michigan, and Ontario – see Figure 2.1. 
This pathway in northeastern Ohio became unavailable with the collapse of FE’s 
transmission system. The electricity then took alternative paths to the load centres 
located along the shore of Lake Erie – see Figure 2.2. Power surged in from west-
ern Ohio and Indiana on one side and from Pennsylvania through New York and 
Ontario around the northern side of Lake Erie. Transmission lines in these areas, 
however, were already heavily loaded with normal flows, and some of them began 
to trip. 
The northeast then separated from the rest of the Eastern Interconnection due to 
these additional power surges. The power surges resulting from the FE system 
failures caused lines in neighbouring areas to see overloads that caused impedance 
relays to operate4. The result was a wave of line trips through western Ohio that 
separated AEP from FE - - Figure 2.3. Then the line trips progressed northward in-
to Michigan separating western and eastern Michigan - - Figure 2.4. With paths 
cut from the west, a massive power surge flowed from PJM into New York and 
Ontario in a counter-clockwise flow around Lake Erie to serve the load still con-
nected in eastern Michigan and northern Ohio - - Figure 2.4. Power flow from On-
tario into Detroit suddenly changed direction and a period of sustained oscillations 
ensued indicating system instability. The impedance relays on the lines between 
PJM and New York saw the massive power surge as faults and tripped those lines. 
Lines in western Ontario also became overloaded and tripped - - Figure 2.5 and 
Figure 2.6. The entire northeastern United States and the province of Ontario then 
became a large electrical island separated from the rest of the Eastern Interconnec-
tion -- Figure 2.7. This large island, which had been importing power prior to the 
cascade, quickly became unstable as there was not sufficient generation in opera-
tion within it to meet electricity demand. Systems to the south and west of the 
split, such as PJM, AEP and others further away remained intact and were mostly 
unaffected by the outage. Once the northeast split from the rest of the Eastern In-
terconnection, the cascade was isolated. 
2.1.2 Criticality of ICT systems for the USA/Canada blackout 
The most critical issue from the point of view of ICT systems was that during 
the crucial hour when transmission lines started to trip, the operators at FE control 
room were unaware of what was going on in their systems. Not only there were 
unaware of the situation but that did not know that they were unaware. It is quite 
                                                          
4 Impedance relay trips a transmission line when its load exceeds a pre-set val-
ue. 
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likely that had they known, they could have taken actions to avert the fast-
spreading blackout. It is important to emphasise that time-criticality is essential for 
preventing blackouts. This is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the number of 
system elements that tripped during the blackout. Once a cascade starts, it is next 
to impossible to stop it. 
 
Figure 3 Speed of blackout spreading [1] 
The report [1] identified a number of causes of the blackout and they were also 
reviewed in [2]. Below we quote the causes [1] that directly relate to ICT systems 
: 
 FE lacked procedures to ensure that their operators were continually aware of 
the functional state of their critical monitoring tools.  
 FE lacked procedures to test effectively the functional state of these tools af-
ter repairs were made.  
 FE did not have additional monitoring tools for high-level visualization of the 
status of their transmission system to facilitate its operators’ understanding of 
transmission system conditions after the failure of their primary monitor-
ing/alarming systems.  
 MISO did not have real-time data from Dayton Power and Light’s Stuart-
Atlanta 345-kV line incorporated into its state estimator (a system monitoring 
tool). This precluded MISO from becoming aware of FE’s system problems 
earlier and providing diagnostic assistance to FE.  
 MISO’s reliability coordinators were using non-real-time data to support real-
time ―flowgate‖ monitoring. This prevented MISO from detecting an N-1 se-
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curity violation in FE’s system and from assisting FE in necessary relief ac-
tions.  
 MISO lacked an effective means of identifying the location and significance 
of transmission line breaker operations reported by their Energy Management 
System (EMS). Such information would have enabled MISO operators to be-
come aware earlier of important line outages. PJM and MISO lacked joint 
procedures or guidelines on when and how to coordinate a security limit vi-
olation observed by one of them in the other’s area due to a contingency near 
their common boundary.  
2.2 Italian blackout on 28 September 2003. 
The blackout happened at 3 am when Italy was importing 6651 MW from 
France, Switzerland, Austria and Slovenia [3]. The import constituted about 24% 
of total demand and was about 300 MW above the agreed import level. The pat-
tern of flows into Italy through the tie-lines depends on the overall generation pat-
tern in surrounding countries. At the time, the Swiss transmission grid was highly 
stressed operating close to (N-1) security criterion however the Italian System Op-
erator (SO) was not aware of it. The high usage of Swiss grid by imports to Italy 
was difficult to control by the Swiss operator by its own means. 
2.2.1 The course of events 
At 3.01 am a tree flashover tripped an overhead 380 kV Mettlen-Lavorgo line 
in Switzerland – see Figure 4. At the time the loading on the line was about 86% 
of its maximum capacity and the flashover was probably caused by insufficient 
distance of the tree from the conductors. An attempt was made to reclose the line 
but it was unsuccessful due to a too high phase angle difference (42
o
) resulting 
from a high power flow to Italy. The load carried by the tripped line was taken 
over by other parallel lines and resulted in overloading by 10% of another 380 kV 
line Sils-Soazza – see Figure 4. According to operating standards the line load 
should have been relieved within 15 minutes to prevent automatic disconnection. 
The Swiss operator, ETRANS, telephoned the Italian operator GRTN at 3.11 
am and requested reduction of imports by 300 MW to the previously agreed le-
vels. According to ETRANS, they have also informed GRTN about the line out-
age but this claim is disputed by GRTN. GRTN reduced import at 3.21 am by 
shutting down pumps at pumped-storage plants but this, together with some inter-
nal countermeasures undertaken within the Swiss system, was not sufficient and at 
3.25 am, i.e. 24 minutes after the first line tripped, the overloaded Sils-Soazza line 
sagged and tripped after a tree flashover. From this moment on, a severe system 
failure was inevitable. Loss of the second import line resulted in a severe overload 
of other import lines and the third line (Airolo-Mettlen) tripped after 4 seconds. 
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Additionally, Italy lost synchronism with the rest of UCTE (loss of angle stability) 
and the remaining import lines tripped almost instantaneously isolating Italy from 
the rest of Europe at 3.25 am. Quite importantly, the dynamic interaction between 
the Italy and rest of UCTE main grid during the last seconds before separation led 
to a fast voltage collapse in Italy. Following islanding of Italy, the internal genera-
tion deficit was about 6.4 GW and frequency started to fall. Although about 10 
GW of load was shed by automatic under-frequency load shedding, it proved inef-
fective as 21 out of 50 thermal plants were tripped due to low voltage even before 
frequency reached 47.5 Hz. Consequently the whole Italy, apart from Sardinia, 
was blacked out 2 minutes and 30 seconds after separation.  
 
 
Figure 4. Italian blackout and its timeline [3]. 
Following separation of Italy, the rest of UCTE network was also in a danger-
ous position. Frequency quickly increased to 50.25 Hz, significant power fluctua-
tions were recorded and the European power flows took an unpredicted pattern. 
Some generating units were tripped by over-frequency or under-voltage relays.  
Loading of lines from France to Germany and Belgium increased significantly. 
However the system operators took various emergency actions so that further 
spreading of blackouts was avoided. 
2.2.2 Criticality of ICT systems for the Italian blackout  
Similarly as it was the case with the US blackout, the real underlying reason for 
such a widespread blackout was insufficient coordination of real-time security as-
sessment and control between the Swiss and Italian System Operators. Additional-
ly Italian system operator was unaware of the overall load flow situation in Europe 
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and the resulting consequences for Italy. Proper ICT systems would have made 
exchange of real-time information possible and could have prevented the blackout. 
The report [3] also concluded that in Europe, where the network is highly 
meshed and stability problems never appeared to be so critical, power system sta-
bility must be thoroughly analysed - even in the case of N-2 contingencies. This 
will require deeper stability analyses, in order to identify possible conditions lead-
ing to stability problems and to define suitable countermeasures if necessary. Such 
system-wide stability analyses would require a continent-wide comprehensive ICT 
system. 
2.3 Need for coordination of operation in interconnected power 
systems 
One of the main problems with cross-border trades in an interconnected power 
system is that trades do not travel according to "contract paths" agreed between 
the seller and the buyer but rather they flow over many transmission lines, as de-
termined by Kirchhoff's and Ohm's laws. This is referred to as a parallel, or loop-
flow, effect. Consequently utilities find their networks loaded with power transfers 
they have little idea about. Figure 5 shows different routes through which an as-
sumed 1000 MW trade between Northern France and Italy would flow [4]. Only 
38% of power would flow directly from France to Italy; the remaining 62% would 
flow through different parallel routes loading the transit networks. Note that 15% 
of power would even flow in a round way via Belgium and Netherlands.  
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage shares through different transit routes for a trade from northern France to It-
aly [4]. 
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Parallel flows did not cause major problems pre 1990, as inter-area exchanges 
were usually agreed well in advance by the system operators and were relatively 
small. Post 1990, inter-area trades have not only increased significantly in volume, 
but they also started to be arranged by independent agents, rather than system op-
erators. The result is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows that a large proportion of 
flows on the Belgian grid in 1999 was unexpected by the Belgian system operator. 
That situation led to a few nearly avoided blackouts in Belgium in 1990s. 
A similar parallel flow effect was one of the main factors contributing to US 
and Italian blackouts. In the case of US, as the existing transmission corridors 
were increasingly blocked by lines tripping off, power to supply northern Ohio 
and Ontario had to find alternative ways and did so through neighbouring utilities 
(Michigan, PJM and New York) – see Figure 2. The relevant system operators 
suddenly saw huge increases in power transfers through their territories but they 
did not know what caused them and could do little about them.  
 
 
Figure 6. Expected and unidentified flows through Belgian grid [5].  
In the case of Italian blackout, transfers through Switzerland to Italy depended 
on the overall pattern of generation in surrounding countries. Although some of 
Swiss lines were operating close to their limits, Swiss operators could do little to 
relieve them.  
Proper accounting for parallel flows is difficult enough in operational planning 
stages. In emergencies, when power system topology may be different to the as-
sumed one and some power stations may be lost, proper accounting for parallel 
flows would require real-time security monitoring and automatic exchange of in-
formation between SOs, rather than telephone-based coordination. 
Proper coordination between System Operators in an interconnected power sys-
tem would require a overcoming a number of technical, political and organisation 
challenges [6]. The best way forward would be to change the paradigm of opera-
tion from the existing decentralised to the coordinated one in which each SO 
would still look after its own area in day-to-day operation and planning but neces-
sary coordination would be required for system-wide security assessment and con-
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trol purposes. To do that information would have to be exchanged to assess the 
impact of planned trades and outages on all the areas involved or, in other words, 
to assess accurately all the parallel flows in both operational planning and real-
time operation stages. Furthermore, real-time coordinated security assessment 
would be needed to assess the impact of any contingencies on the whole intercon-
nected network. Obviously this would require advanced ICT systems. The next 
step would be coordinated reaction to contingencies. When each SO defends itself 
against a contingency without taking into account the big picture, the results may 
be detrimental for the system as the whole. The next important problem is deter-
mination of who, and how much, should pay for the reliability-connected actions. 
Development of ICT system to support such a mode of operation is a technical 
challenge but one which can be relatively easily overcome as the underlying tech-
nology is readily available. The main challenge is political: overcoming resistance 
of individual utilities to give up partially their interdependence and operate within 
the paradigm of a distributed, but coordinated, control.  One of the other main 
problems with increased coordination is the necessity to exchange operational in-
formation about each control area. Such information could be deemed to be com-
mercially sensitive so the SOs would be reluctant to share it. Traditional load-flow 
or stability programs require detailed information about generation and demand 
profiles at each node but for proposed coordinated operation and control exchange 
of full individual nodal profiles is not needed. The important thing is to asses the 
system-wide impact of situation in each control area. Further research is needed to 
establish what type of information is necessary to be exchanged, and in what way, 
in order to perform system-wide security assessment and control whilst which in-
formation can be deemed to be left as private to individual SOs. Following that, 
appropriate organisational structures would have to be established. There may be a 
need to establish a single body charged with maintaining real-time security of the 
whole interconnected system. 
The need for improved coordination between utilities has been clearly recog-
nised by the industry. The situation has improved over the last few years with es-
tablishment of Electric Reliability Organisation in the USA in 2005 and a number 
of initiatives undertaken by UCTE. However there is still a long way to achieve a 
proper real-time cooperation between utilities. 
3 Preventing blackouts: Wide Area Measurement Systems 
(WAMS) 
Utilities rely on SCADA systems for operational monitoring of their systems – 
see Appendix – but SCADA systems have some serious shortcomings. Firstly 
SCADA relies on the state estimator to obtain an estimate of the exact system to-
pology, power flows and voltages. However all known state estimation algorithms 
have shortcomings especially with regard to bad data identification and robustness 
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[7]. Bad measurements, especially incorrect switch statues, may result in large er-
rors in the estimation results. The periods of measurements in a SCADA scan are 
not synchronous causing significant time skew errors. All those errors may se-
riously affect power system security evaluation by SO.   
The wave of power system blackouts in 2003 has provided an impetus to de-
velopment of monitoring systems based on GPS-synchronised measurement tech-
nology referred to as Wide Area Measurement Systems – see Appendix B for 
technological details. Time-synchronised Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in-
troduce the possibility of directly measuring the system state (i.e. voltage magni-
tudes and their angles) rather than estimating it based on system models and tele-
metry data.  As measurements are tracked 20 to 60 times per second, PMUs can 
track system dynamics in real time. WAMS systems have a wide area of applica-
tions in monitoring and control [8] but here we will concentrate on the applica-
tions regarding prevention of blackouts.  
Due to their accuracy and wide area coverage, WAMS may enable early warn-
ing systems to detect conditions that lead to catastrophic events, help, with restora-
tion and improve the quality of data for event analysis. It is worth noting here that 
it took several months to gather information from different measurement stations 
following the 2003 USA/Canada blackout and perform analyses to recreate the 
course of events [1]. On the other hand synchronised frequency traces from differ-
ent parts of Europe were available almost immediately following the UCTE dis-
turbance in 2006 due to availability of PMUs [9].  
WAMS may prevent blackouts due to their ability to provide system monitor-
ing and tracking of power system dynamics in real time. Onset of unstable oscilla-
tions usually precedes a blackout and this can be detected quickly [10]. WAMS-
based wide area protection and control systems offer a chance to see ―the big pic-
ture‖, stop power system degradation, restore the system to a normal state and mi-
nimise the effect of disturbance [11]. WAMS could also provide a crucial building 
block for the concept of ―smart grids‖ through their wide-area communication in-
frastructure and ability to monitor power operation in real time. 
Although WAMS systems have been implemented in a number of places in 
USA, Brazil, China and various places in Europe, their more widespread adoption 
is still yet to be achieved. Probably the main factor preventing a wider use of 
WAMS systems is a lack of application algorithms which would provide a signifi-
cant additional value in everyday power system operation. Also a business case 
for adoption of WAMS is not entirely clear as the main advantage of using them 
lies in improved system security which is a ―common good‖ benefiting everyone. 
All European countries have adopted, or are adopting, a liberalised model of orga-
nisation of electricity supply industry in which distribution, supply, generation and 
transmission sectors are separated (so-called unbundling). In such a business mod-
el costs of WAMS, and resulting benefits, cannot always be easily associated with 
one particular player. This makes it difficult to justify and finance any widespread 
installations. 
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4 Conclusions 
The widespread blackouts of 2003 have exposed the critical role of ICT sys-
tems in maintaining reliable operation of power systems. Fundamental errors in 
providing back-up and alarm function in the control room were one of the main 
contributing factors to the 2003 USA/Canada blackout. The lack of proper ICT in-
frastructure to enable efficient communication and cooperation between System 
Operators in Italy and Switzerland led to delayed remedial actions and the conse-
quent blackout of Italy in 2003. Improved ICT systems would enable a better real-
time cooperation and coordination between utilities in an interconnected power 
system but the main challenge is political: overcoming resistance of individual 
utilities to give up partially their interdependence and operate within the paradigm 
of a distributed, but coordinated, control.  
Emergence of GPS-synchronised Wide Area Measurement Systems holds a 
great promise for improved monitoring and control of modern power systems and 
therefore avoiding future blackouts. Despite some initial successes with WAMS 
deployment, their wider adoption is still to be achieved due to a lack of application 
algorithms which would make WAMS systems more relevant to everyday power 
system operation. Another obstacle may lay in the unbundled industry organisa-
tion which makes it difficult to associate costs and benefits of WAMS with one 
particular industry player. 
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Appendix A: Maintaining reliability of an interconnected power 
system 
A control area is a geographic area within a large interconnected network in 
which a System Operator (SO) balances generation and loads in real time to main-
tain reliable operation. Control areas are linked with each other through transmis-
sion interconnection tie lines. Close cooperation between System Operators is re-
quired to support the reliability of their interconnection. There are approximately 
140 control areas in North America while in Europe a control area usually means a 
single country although larger countries may be divided into more control areas 
(as e.g. Germany). In the US, reliability coordinators are responsible for coordina-
tion between a number of SOs controlling different control areas.  
ICT system are fundamental for maintaining power system reliability. System 
Operators look at potential problems that could arise on their systems by using 
contingency analyses, driven from state estimation, that are fed by data collected 
by the SCADA system. 
 
SCADA: System operators use System Control and Data Acquisition systems 
to acquire power system data and control power system equipment. SCADA sys-
tems have three types of elements: field remote terminal units (RTUs), communi-
cation to and between the RTUs, and one or more Master Stations. Field RTUs, 
installed at generation plants and substations, are combination data gathering and 
device control units. They gather and provide information of interest to system 
operators, such as the status of a breaker (switch), the voltage on a line or the 
amount of real and reactive power being produced by a generator, and execute 
control operations such as opening or closing a breaker. Telecommunications fa-
cilities, such as telephone lines or microwave radio channels, are provided for the 
field RTUs so they can communicate with one or more SCADA Master Stations 
or, less commonly, with each other. Master stations are the pieces of the SCADA 
system that initiate a cycle of data gathering from the field RTUs over the com-
munications facilities, with time cycles ranging from every few seconds to as long 
as several minutes. In many power systems, Master Stations are fully integrated 
into the control room, serving as the direct interface to the Energy Management 
System (EMS), receiving incoming data from the field RTUs and relaying control 
operations commands to the field devices for execution. 
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State Estimation: System Operators must have visibility (condition informa-
tion) over their own transmission facilities, and recognize the impact on their own 
systems of events and facilities in neighbouring systems. To accomplish this, sys-
tem state estimators use real-time data measurements (real and reactive power 
flows, the state of switches) available on a number, but not all, of transmission 
lines, substation and other plants. This information is fed to a mathematical model 
of the power system to estimate voltages and real and reactive power flows 
throughout the system.  
 
Contingency Analysis: A power system must be able to withstand on its own, 
i.e. without intervention of the System Operator, impact of probable events (such 
as tripping of lines or generators) that are referred to as contingencies. The most 
common criterion used is ―N-1‖ contingency which means that a trip of a single 
element should not result in overloading of power system elements, loss of stabili-
ty or voltage violation. This gives SO time to adjust operation should a contingen-
cy happen. Contingency analysis is run regularly by SO based on the current sys-
tem operating conditions as identified by the state estimator. 
Appendix B: Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) 
Wide area measurement system (WAMS) is a measurement system based on 
transmission of analogue and/or digital information using telecommunication sys-
tems and allowing a synchronisation (time stamping) of the measurements using a 
common time reference. Measuring devices used by WAMS have their own 
clocks synchronised with the common time reference using satellite GPS (global 
positioning system).  
WAMS and WAMPAC based on GPS signal 
The satellite GPS system is the result of many years of research undertaken by 
US civil and military institutions aiming to develop a very accurate navigation 
system. The system has been made available for civil users around the world.  
The accuracy of the GPS reference time of about 1 μs is good enough to meas-
ure the AC phasors with frequency 50 Hz or 60 Hz. For a 50 Hz system, the pe-
riod time corresponding to a full rotation corresponding to 360
0
 is 20 ms = 20 x 
10
3 μs. The time error of 1μs corresponds to the angle error of 3600/(20 x 103) = 
0.018
0
 .i.e. 0.005%. Such an error is small enough from the point of view of pha-
sor measurements. 
The possibility of measuring directly voltage and current phasors in a power 
system has created new control possibilities: 
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 Monitoring of operation of a large power system from the point of view 
of voltage angles and magnitudes and frequency. This is referred to as 
wide area monitoring (WAM).  
 Application of special power system protections based on measuring 
phasors in large parts of a power system. Such protection is referred to as 
wide area protection (WAP).  
 Application of control systems based on measuring phasors in large parts 
of a power system. Such control is referred to as wide area control 
(WAC).  
Wide area measurement system WAMS integrated with wide area monitoring 
WAM and wide area protection WAP and wide area control WAC is referred to as 
wide area measurement, protection, and control (WAMPAC).  
Recent years have seen a dynamic expansion of WAMPAC systems. Mea-
surement techniques and telecommunication techniques have made a fast progress 
but the main barrier for the expansion of WAMPAC system is a lack of WAP and 
WAC control algorithms based on the use of phasors. There has been a lot of re-
search devoted to that problem but the state of knowledge cannot be regarded as 
satisfactory. 
Structures of WAMS and WAMPAC  
WAMS, and constructed on their basis WAMPAC, may have different struc-
tures depending on telecommunication media used. With point-to-point connec-
tions, the structure may be multi-layer when PMU data are sent to phasor data 
concentrators PDC. One concentrator may service 20-30 PMUs. Data from con-
centrators is then sent to computers executing SCADA/EMS functions or 
WAP/WAC phasor-based functions. An example of a three-layer structure is 
shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7 An example of a three-layer structure of WAMPAC. PMU – phasor measurement unit, 
PDC – phasor data concentrator, P&C –protection and control based on phasors 
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In each stage of data transmission, delays are incurred. Concentrators in the 
lowest layer service PMUs. As the delays are the smallest at that stage, the con-
centrators may supply data not only for monitoring (WAM) but also for protection 
(WAP) and control (WAC).  
The middle-layer concentrators combine data from individual areas of a power 
system. The data may be used for monitoring and for some WAP or WAC func-
tions.  
The top, central, concentrator services the area concentrators. As at that stage 
the delays are the longest, the central layer may be used mainly for monitoring and 
for those SCADA/EMS functions that do not require a high speed of data trans-
mission. 
 
 
Figure 8 WAMPAC structure based on a flexible communication platform 
The main advantage of the layered structure is the lack of direct connections 
between area concentrators. Such connections may make it difficult, or even im-
possible, to execute those WAP or WAC functions that require data from a num-
ber of areas. The only way to get access to data from another area is via the central 
concentrator which incurs additional delays. That problem may be solved by add-
ing additional communication between area concentrators. That leads to more 
complicated communication structures as more links are introduced. 
Computer networks consisting of many local digital area networks LAN and 
one wide area digital network WAN offer best possibilities of further WAMPAC 
development and application. Such a structure is illustrated in Figure 8. LAN net-
work services all measurement units and protection and control devices in indi-
vidual substation. The connecting digital wide area network (WAN) creates a flex-
ible communication platform. Individual devices can communicate with each 
other directly. Such a flexible platform may be used to create special protection 
and control systems locally, for each area, and centrally. The platform could also 
be used to provide data for local and central SCADA/EMS systems.  
